The role of China’s Investment in Shaping the Redevelopment of Afghanistan

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ABSTRACT

Background. The Afghanistan-China strategic relationship is multifaceted, characterized by economic convergences, security cooperation, and mutual diplomatic support. China’s Belt and Road Initiative has played a significant role in deepening ties, especially through infrastructure development in Afghanistan.

Purpose. In this paper authors tried to explore Afghanistan and China relations, how China plays an important role in the redevelopment of Afghanistan, discuss the prospects and challenges facing Chinese–Afghan relations, including from a regional perspective and also discussed how China fits into the vacuum left by the US withdrawal.

Method. The method used applies a qualitative method that focuses on looking at social phenomena that occur in society.

Results. At the same time, a rather stable Afghanistan free from threats by militant and terrorist groups could provide opportunities for China and other regional states to contribute to its post-conflict economic reconstruction and development.

Conclusion. At the period since the Taliban took over an Afghanistan emptied of its foreign presence, there has been much more speculation that China will step in to fill the geopolitical, security and economic vacuum left by the West’s withdrawal. China surely has direct interests in a stable, developed and well-governed Afghanistan, not least to prevent spillover and assets in the wider regions of Central and South Asia.

KEYWORDS
Cyber, Fraud, Law Enforcement

INTRODUCTION

After the United States’ withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 and the return of the Taliban, much has been written about the expected role of China, as both a neighbouring state and a major global power, in the future of the country (Bahji dkk., 2021). The security, economic and humanitarian vacuum left by the end of the US occupation has significant suggestions for China’s interests in the country and the wider region in terms of both challenges and opportunities (Fine dkk., 2019). Developments in Afghanistan might pose its signature geo-economic project, the Belt and Road Initiative, in Pakistan and Central Asia (Stawinska-Witoszynska dkk., 2021). At the same time, a rather stable Afghanistan free from threats by militant and terrorist groups could
provide opportunities for China and other regional states to contribute to its post-conflict economic reconstruction and development. Taliban in August 2021 took over a country suffering from more than four decades of sustained warfare, faces a combination of humanitarian, economic and financial crises (Price, 2022). External aid, which earlier constituted nearly half the country’s gross domestic product, has largely evaporated (Price, 2022). The amount of security incidents and battle-related deaths has drastically declined in the past year, but the Taliban continues to shelter a number of militant extremist and terrorist groups that pose a threat to regional and global security (Brodeur dkk., 2021). Human insecurity has touched crisis levels in terms of hunger, poverty, underdevelopment, lack of educational opportunities and targeted ethnic and gender-based discrimination.

There is no doubt that China has the capacity in the form of aid and economic resources to play a major role in Afghanistan’s post-conflict reconstruction and economic development. It also has pure vested interests in a stable and secure Afghanistan, which could provide opportunities for investment in the country’s mineral resource sector (Frisone dkk., 2020). More ever, it is yet uncertain how willing China might be to proactively expand what until now has been a largely passive role and limited footprint in the country.

China aspects significant challenges in dealing with a regime that maintains a domestic governing ideology that is anathematic to the international community and that continues to host militant extremist groups which China considers a direct threat to its interests at home and abroad. The usefulness of China’s approach will depend on how credible its offer of positive incentives in the economic and political domains is to the Taliban leadership, in return for the latter’s pledge to address the Chinese government’s security concerns (Ukhov dkk., 2021). In short, China’s approach to Afghanistan walks a tightrope and continues to be marked by pragmatism.

Even though China is a potentially critical player when it comes to security and development in Afghanistan, the Chinese government believes that Afghanistan’s other neighboring states can and should contribute collectively to addressing the challenges of rebuilding and integrating the country into regional security, economic and diplomatic networks (Auer & Griffiths, 2022). At minimum the past decade (Louderback dkk., 2021), China has played an increasingly prominent role in promoting regional, and extra-regional, dialogue and cooperation in multilateral and mini-lateral platforms.

As part of an extensive assessment of China’s role in a Taliban-led Afghanistan, this paper discusses the point to which such platforms including the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting Between the Neighboring Countries of Afghanistan have played a constructive role in Afghan development and security from 2001 since August 2021 or could play such a role in future and clearly traces the China–Afghanistan relationship prior to August 2021. Also trying to find out what role China is willing to play in these broader regional frameworks.

Section two outlines China’s security (Mazar dkk., 2020), economic and development interests in Afghanistan especially footprint under the current Taliban regime (Hing dkk., 2022). Section three discusses the prospects and challenges facing Chinese–Afghan relations, including from a regional perspective (Claesdotter-Knutsson dkk., 2022). Section four concludes with a discussion on how China fits into the vacuum left by the US withdrawal.

**RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

In writing this article, the author applies a qualitative method that focuses on looking at social phenomena that occur in society (Mutiarasari & Herawati, 2020). The place and location of the research conducted was at Sukabumi City Police (Mao dkk., 2019). The data and data sources used
are primary data such as the Criminal Code, Laws, Court Decisions that have binding force, as well as secondary data consisting of research-related books, journals and scientific articles, websites as well as internet sources used to help the author conduct analysis as information material (Subekti dkk., 2021). Data collection techniques related to the problems and difficulties of this research were collected or taken by the author by means of; literature study (Library Research), observation (Field Research) and interviews (Interview) (Siboy dkk., 2023). This research is processed and analyzed by the stage of data collection in accordance with material law derived from primary legal materials and secondary legal materials which are then evaluated to provide prescriptive (Scarabottolo dkk., 2022). Researchers continuously analyze the data obtained, reduce irrelevant data, display data and interpret data.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION
China and Afghanistan Relationship (2001-2021)

The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan was shaped in 2004 in the aftermath of the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the overthrow of the Taliban (Butt & Siregar, 2021). After overthrowing the Taliban, Afghanistan’s interim Administration was shaped under Hamid Karzai, and United Nations Security Council formed the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to provide security to the Karzai administration (Ali dkk., 2021). Later the September 11 attacks, Beijing permitted the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to open a Beijing office in 2002 to enhance anti-terrorism cooperation with the United States (Javaid, 2016). in case, China refused to participate in any international military presence in Afghanistan and did not allow coalition forces to operate out of Chinese bases or airspace. China’s actions might have stemmed from their assessment of the effect of their military presence in Afghanistan.

China initially followed a policy of non-intervention regarding the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (henceforth Afghanistan) and its engagement with Afghanistan was mostly aid. China distributed US $4 million of humanitarian aid for Afghanistan in 2001 followed by an additional US $1 million at the Tokyo donor conference in 2002 (Formosa dkk., 2020). In same year, China announced an aid package amounting to the US $ 150 million (Mustafa and Junaid, 2020: 427).

In December 2002, China beside with other countries bordering Afghanistan i.e., Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) signed the Declaration on Good-Neighborly Relations (UNSC, Afghanistan Good Neighborly Relations Declaration, 2002). In 2006 China and Afghanistan have signed the Treaty of Good-neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation. In the treaty, the two sides decided to signed the Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation and establish a joint economic and Trade Committee (Koh, 2020). Chinese government later on granted zero-tariff on 278 items of Afghan exports to China as of July 1, 2006 (Imran, 2019: 58).

The 2006 treaty opened paths of Chinese investment in Afghanistan. For example, in 2008 Chinese company Jiangxi Copper pledged to invest approximately US $4 Billion to obtain 100 percent of the rights to mine copper in Aynak cooper (Selten dkk., 2020). According to this project China also committed to building a thermal power plant with a capacity of 400 megawatts, a hospital, and a mosque.

In 2012 China and Afghanistan signed a joint declaration on beginning Strategic and Cooperative Partnership (Fair dkk., 2020). The stated aim of the joint declaration was Peaceful Co-existence, in line with the purpose and values of the Charter of the United Nations, international law, and the principles enshrined in the 2006 Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation.

**China’s interest to investment in Afghanistan**

China, maximum populous and rapidly growing industrial country of the world, has shown its strong political, economic and security-based interests in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is rich in positions of natural reserves (Miernicki dkk., 2019). China is trying to gain access to the natural resources like Aynak copper and oil reserves, provided that economic aid and thus improving political relations (Yermolenko dkk., 2022). Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is playing an amount in addressing security problems of Afghanistan and China is observer while Afghanistan is a member of SAARC. On the other case, Afghan government is appreciating and taking this greater role in a positive sense because it is bringing modesty in their relations from bilateral partnership to strategic partnership.

Even however the Chinese government had maintained bilateral diplomatic ties with successive Afghan governments since 2001, it never totally cut off contact with the Taliban. Even this contact only intensified after 2014, when the Obama administration announced a date for US troop withdrawa (Yakamercan dkk., 2021). China appointed its first country-specific unusual envoy in relation to Afghanistan in that year and became proactive in political mediation between the Afghan government and the Taliban, participating in the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG), together with Pakistan and the United States, and in the Moscow Dialogue format, established in 2016 and 2017 respectively (Saadatzadeh dkk., 2019). These efforts were through in support of ‘a comprehensive and inclusive Afghan-led and Afghan-owned reconciliation process’ among the country’s different political factions. China’s facilitation and engagement also specialized that it would have access to whoever eventually emerged as the government, including the Taliban leaders.

Chinese security interests in Afghanistan depend in part on the standing of the incentives that China can offer to a country that is among the world’s least developed according to economic as well as social indicators. Afghanistan’s economy has shrunk quickly from an already low base since the Taliban takeover in August 2021 (Dalen dkk., 2019). The collapse of the mostly aid-driven economy and the freezing of over $9 billion in Afghan foreign assets through sanctions, in addition to other factors, has led to an unprecedented economic, financial and humanitarian crisis (Parveen, 2023: 27).

The Afghans consumer market is limited interest to China, but China has offered various economic concessions, with the waiving of 98 percent of tariffs and a recent resumption of visa issuances for Afghan businesspersons. Negotiations on the Aynak copper mine and the Amu Darya oil project are continuing, subsequent visits by Chinese business delegations and executives. However, there has been not progress beyond these talks. The US sanctions imposed after the Taliban takeover place short-term limits on large-scale investments, but a range of barriers also limit the prospects of these projects coming to completion in the medium term. Beyond ever present security concerns, extraction projects are hampered by the lack of facilitating infrastructure, together with transport facilities. China is itself a major producer and exporter of mineral resources, with rare earth minerals, so there is no pressing need for these projects to be developed for supply purposes alone. The question of return on investment, that is challenging even in more developed
markets such as Pakistan, suggests a hard balance between China’s political and economic logic in the Afghan context.

Finally, previously the Taliban takeover, Afghanistan was already one of the world’s least welcoming investment environments in terms of the rule of law, corruption and poor economic governance. The takeover led to the collapse of what had been supposedly functioning institutions, including in the financial sector. Forthcoming Chinese investments also face the broader challenge of directing funds to sustainable and inclusive economic development.

Some smaller-scale economic activity through private and public sector Chinese entities and individuals including steel manufacturing and precious metal trading has continued or resumed since August 2021. In April 2022, the Taliban re-approved a $216 million Chinese investment project on behalf of an industrial park outside Kabul, which is expected to host 150 factories (Khan, 2023: 224). Upcoming prospects include greater trade in agricultural products, a sector on which up to 80 per cent of livelihoods in Afghanistan in some way depend. The ‘pine nut corridor’ initiative by China in January 2022, in which 1500 tons of Afghan pine nuts were imported by air, has proved demonstrative in this regard. China has also expressed an interest in assist to find alternatives to opium production, which is currently Afghanistan’s main export in terms of value.

China’s economic activity is much more substantial somewhere else in Central and South Asia. Pakistan is the location of the largest top investment project of the BRI, the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which in his first phase comprises over $25 billion in investment in port facilities, transport, energy, industrial and agricultural infrastructure, industrial parks and special economic zones, as well as other investment projects moreover completed or under way. In conversations with Afghan and Pakistani officials, Chinese officials have suggested to they would like to bring Afghanistan into CPEC. However, CPEC is itself encountering multiple obstacles, together with security issues such as attacks on Chinese companies economic and security risks would be even higher in Afghanistan.

While China has long supported economic integration and incorporating Afghanistan into broader regional trade, investment and transport networks, the greater interconnection and measure of goods and people could present challenges from a security standpoint. However, an agreement has been signed on a multi-modal economic corridor to ship containers from China through Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan into northern Afghanistan, and the first shipping containers arrived in September 2022 (Encarnation, and Fair, 2023: 9).

**China’s developmental interests in Afghanistan**

Beyond ongoing consultations around large-scale investments that are not likely to materialize in the medium term, and the above-mentioned smaller-scale economic investment projects, there has been Chinese engagement since August 2021 that could be considered developmental in nature. In December 2021, a working group on humanitarian assistance and economic reconstruction was attended by representatives of a variety of relevant ministries from China and the Taliban interim government (Takahashi dkk., 2020). Nothing like Western and other multilateral donors, China traditionally refrains from using aid conditionally to support or promote political, governance or even economic reform. Ever since August 2021, the Western and UN developmental footprint has been drastically reduced in an effort to induce a change in Taliban policies on political inclusivity and gender equality, among other issues. Such hard work has thus far failed. Significantly, China has also emphasized the need for the Taliban to be more inclusive. However, the promotion of standards is of much lower priority for Chinese officials, who emphasize non-interference and the particularities of Afghan national conditions.
The December 2021 meeting concentrated on providing aid and capacity training, as well as facilitating high-value agricultural exports of pine nuts, saffron and pomegranates from Afghanistan to the Chinese market (Akers dkk., 2020). Maintenance to local businesses and Afghan producers, through such dedicated projects or initiatives as the pine nut corridor, open up the possibility of private sector development. Such initiatives are in mark with China’s overall approach to foreign aid, which places greater importance on the commercial dimension of cooperation. Whether such projects are viable in terms of sustainable economic development or developmental impact remains to be seen.

It is remarkable that China pledged an emergency aid package of $31 million the day after the Taliban announced its formation of an interim government. The aid package involved food supplies and 3 million doses of Covid-19 vaccines (Khan, 2023: 224). Although it was well received by the Taliban, Chinese assistance was minor compared to the UN’s funding request for over $4 billion in humanitarian aid in 2022. Expressively, the USA remains by far the largest single provider of humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan, donating over $1.1 billion in the year following the Taliban takeover. Following a shocking earthquake in south-eastern Afghanistan, US assistance amounted to seven times that of China’s $7.5 million in emergency aid. There are so far no indications that China is willing to stage into the role of a primary development aid provider.

It is also important that Chinese development and humanitarian aid to a Taliban-led Afghanistan has so far not been channeled through multilateral UN-led formats, such as the Afghanistan Humanitarian Fund or the Special Trust Fund for Afghanistan, or indeed any of the dedicated UN agencies. Instead, China has prioritized bilateral and mini-lateral formats for its assistance, such as the Tunxin Initiative with Afghanistan’s neighboring states launched in April 2022. This is in line with China’s pattern of and modalities for provided that development assistance globally, which tend to favor bilateral arrangements, by way of its more regional approach to peace and development in Afghanistan. It also reflects China’s pursuit of its security interests, which requires more direct switches of economic influence. To the extent that assistance is channeled through the Taliban, this offerings challenges in terms of governance and accountability for goods and funds. In case, the smaller-scale and more commercially focused nature of Chinese projects could prove effective in a country where large-scale aid inflows have facilitated staggering levels of fraud, waste and corruption.

**China’s Economic and Political Interests in Afghanistan**

Taliban’s spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid on 2 September 2021 said an Italian newspaper that ‘Taliban will rely primarily on financing from China in its fight for an economic comeback in Afghanistan’ (Zhang, 2022: 269). China at present has two significant investments in Afghanistan: The Aynak copper mine and the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) 25-year contract for oil taking out in the northern provinces of Faryab and Sar-e-Pol in the Amu Darya Basin. The status of both these projects is in midpoint due to the prevailing unstable situation in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the Chinese government, while negotiating with the Taliban, will surely look to restart both projects.

**Natural Resources in Afghanistan**

There have been numerous reports that Afghanistan currently sits on a goldmine of Natural resources, including rare-earth metals and minerals. The US Geological Survey preliminary valuation is that Afghanistan harbored mineral wealth estimated at more than US $ 1 Trillion, surveying Afghanistan in 2004 and in 2007 (Zyck, 2012: 6). These resources consisted of massive deposits of copper, gold, iron ore, molybdenum, lithium, and cobalt. Unlucky, the Taliban doesn’t
have the technological know-how and capital to extract these resources, pushing the Taliban to rely on China for monetizing these resources.

Aynak Copper

The China’s level of economic aid has also believed China great effect within the Afghan political elite. Ultimately, China’s goodwill and impact won them the most valuable financial deal to the date in Afghanistan. The China’s Metallurgical Group has won the tender for the Aynak copper mine. Group make plans in investing $4 billion in Afghanistan over the next around years, and the incomes will faraway surpass its original investment. China has also won the main projects in oil and also in the gas extraction in northern and western Afghanistan. It is the first time the Afghan government has allowed to a foreign company to extract gas and oil.

The world’s biggest and untouched reserves of Aynak Copper was owned by China Metallurgical Corporation (MCC). It is the largest foreign investment in the history of Afghanistan and if it is explored optimally, it would mark the revenue more than rest if the projects of Afghanistan. Reportedly, this mega project covers of more than 88 billion dollars which happens to be as twice as Afghanistan’s GDP. In 2007, when Afghanistan encouraged foreign investors in direction to invest in natural resource sector of Afghanistan, China’s MCC won the tender of Aynak Copper project in 3.5 billion dollars for the period of 30 years which is the biggest of investment from foreigner so far away in the country. In cost and benefit analysis, the total quantity of this project presents 20 per cent of all FDI in Afghanistan since 2001, and revenue from this project would generate 45 percent of Afghanistan’s national budget only from this single project (Xinbo, (2016: 853).

As well this mega project, China has pledged to construct 400 megawatt power plant in order to support the mining work, beside of the water development and sanitization plant for public. In case of fulfil the demand of power for mining, MCC will tunnel a new coal mine for their generators. Furthermore, the company will build a plant for the refinement of copper ore and a rail track to carry coal to plant and bring copper to China. Regarding to the terms of the project, MCC will invest in infrastructure development in Afghanistan. The company would invest in roads, mosques and schools.

The project is planned to create job opportunities for 4,000 local people and will produce nearby 11 million tons of copper in the next 25 years. In 2010, MCC signed and one more agreement regarding Aynak project that if possible, it will construct railway track, from north of Pakistan, via Aynak and Kabul, to south of Uzbekistan (Pandey, 2019). Success of this project will enhancement further Chinese investments in Afghanistan. Chinese companies would seek for some latitude than other companies.

In this project, China is employing local people indirectly through this recruitment, it is assisting the war-ton society. Similarly, MCC, in all other projects which China has in Afghanistan, it is pursing the policy of generating jobs for the local people, so engaging them on productive activities. Once these people will have their jobs, Afghanistan will become stable and it will serve China in a better.

China is certainly capable on behalf of support the development of Afghanistan’s infrastructure. Early data shows that 5,000 job opportunities will be there in mining and mining support operations, 90 percent of them will be Afghans. Around 15,00020,000 people will be indirectly employed in run-off industries that indirectly support mining operations such as life support, logistics, and marketing goods to the population.
CNPC and Northern Afghanistan’s Oil

Even though CNPC significantly smaller than the Aynak acquisition, China’s most recent investment in Afghanistan’s natural resource sector involves oil in the Amu Darya river basin in northern Afghanistan. According to the Reuters, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), a state-owned enterprise like MCC, won the rights to drill three oil fields in the basin for a period of 25 years in December 2011. These fields are estimated to hold up to 87 million barrels of oil, a rather small amount compared with larger fields in places such as Iran, which often contain billions or tens of billions of barrels. On the other hand, the Afghan government reportedly viewed the tender of these three fields as a test case for larger oil field tender processes in the coming years. Former Afghan Minister of Mines Wahidullah Shahrani told Reuters in 2011, for instance, that the Afghan government was looking to tender drilling rights for a 1.8-billion-barrel oil field near Mzaar-e Sharif in Balkh province in 2012.

By way in Aynak, the Chinese firm offered generous terms, according to China Daily. They would be paying a 15% royalty on oil and a 20% corporate tax on revenues in Afghanistan. Most especially, CNPC will provide 70% of its profits from the venture to the Afghan government (2019: 125). With oil prices around USD 100 per barrel, Shahrani estimates that the Afghan government would take in USD 7 billion from the project over the course of CNPC’s 25-year contract, according to Reuters (Hussain, and Jamali, 2019: 315). The minister confirmed that such calculations are created on 23 years of actual oil extraction given that the first two years of the project will be required for preparations and set-up. In annualized terms, these amount to USD 304.35 million per year for the Afghan government. Lu Gong Xun, president of CNPC’s international division, indicates that the company has not yet calculated clearly how much it will need to invest in the three blocks but estimates the amount to be greater than USD 400 million. A September 2011 article by Bloomberg indicates that CNPC’s bid had also involved plans to build a refinery within Afghanistan. Increasing domestic refining capacity in Afghanistan, which at this time has just one small-scale oil refinery near the Afghanistan-Uzbekistan border, is considered a priority for the Afghan government and private sector (Karim, 2017: 5). At current, the country’s land-locked position makes it dependent on periodically-interrupted supplies via Pakistan and Iran and expensive fuel supplies via Central Asian republics to its North. As this section had demonstrated, Afghanistan’s natural resources have been of exact interest to China and have been the site of significant inward investment. Although, as the experts cited above found, the majority of the financial and employment benefits of natural resource exploitation will not be realized until both security and infrastructure are more fully established.

Prospects and challenges around China and Afghanistan relations

For the Taliban regime that has been economically, diplomatically and financially isolated, its partnership with China holds much pragmatic appeal, given the latter’s economic and political effects internationally. China stays to champion elements of the Taliban’s agenda in UN forums, such as the unfreezing of sanctioned assets. Without correctly recognizing the Taliban diplomatically, Chinese statements stressing Afghan independence and sovereignty, and accepting the ‘objective reality’ of their rule, represent tacit recognition of the regime’s legitimacy. China has made several official statements on the need for the Taliban to reform its governance in terms of ethnic, gender and political inclusivity, but such normative considerations are unlikely to influence the substance of China–Taliban relations insofar as they do not fundamentally affect Afghan or regional stability. Nothing like other major powers, China has no history of overt intervention or invasion, and maintains a level of goodwill among the Taliban leadership, whose primary
grievances have been against the West. The Taliban has even referred to China as its ‘main partner’ in redevelopment the country, and as Afghanistan’s ‘ticket to markets around the world’.

In case of principle, such a relationship is conducive to China’s achievement of its wider security and economic goals. Although, there is a risk of overpromising and under delivering, as well as indications that China has so far been unable to live up to Afghan expectations. The relationship is also contingent on the Taliban’s internal ideological positions, that have been rigidly held even to the detriment of its own foreign and economic policy objectives of achieving international recognition, and support for reconstruction and economic development. In case of foreign pressure, including through sanctions, has done little to convince the Taliban to change course on questions of human rights, gender equality or ethnic and political inclusivity. This make clear that there are upper bounds to what China will be able to achieve through its diplomatic, security or economic ‘carrot-and-stick’ approach. Furthermore, the risks for China are heightened because other competitor extremist groups would be liable to criticize the Taliban for more explicit security cooperation with China. Such cooperation could pose a threat to the Taliban’s internal legitimacy and places limits on the deepness of partnership between China and Afghanistan.

Henceforth, it will be a major challenge for China to persuade the Taliban of the credible prospects and benefits that would accrue from a partnership, while being neither implicated in international condemnation of the latter’s brutal and authoritarian home rule, nor caught in the crosshairs of various militant and extremist groups. Economic benefits are doubtful to materialize in the short term, however, and the Taliban is also courting other regional partners and investors in Russia, India, Iran and Pakistan, each of which have their own aims and interests. The present balance, based on a hedging calculus by both sides, has not yet been stress-tested. How any side might respond to a major incident such as an attack on Chinese nationals, even in third countries, attributable to groups hosted by the Taliban is difficult to predict, but could move a presently stable relationship of mutual regard in a more volatile direction.

In sum, China’s recent policy on Afghanistan demonstrates a strong appetite for a regional rather than a unilateral approach. This is, in part, because the Taliban’s perspectives and interests are intertwined with the problematic geopolitics of the broader region, which China would be hard-pressed to navigate on its own. The need for varied cultural, religious and political expertise and capacity requires an approach that leverages partnerships with Afghanistan’s direct neighbors. China’s broader diplomatic, political and economic clout including regarding Afghanistan’s neighboring countries allows it to mobilize and advance this more multilateral agenda on Afghanistan. But although China may be effective at facilitating a more collective and localized regional approach to Afghanistan’s many peace, security and development challenges, the ultimate litmus test for effective regional cooperation will be the distribution of concrete outcomes beyond declarative statements and discussions. On that score, there have been increasing expectations that China should do more to drive those processes and more actively facilitate conditions conducive to Afghan stability and economic development.

CONCLUSION

It can be concluded based on the research findings presented above that the existence and birth of phishing is part of the variety of crimes that occur in cyberspace as a result of the negative impact of the misuse of technology that is very rapid at this time, where the actions taken by the perpetrator trap or trick their victims who indirectly provide all the information needed. Based on law enforcement in the criminal justice system in Indonesia, phishing crime cases go through three stages of important components including the Police (investigation and investigation), the
Prosecutor's Office (prosecution), and also the Court (examination until the judge's decision). In examining and bringing phishing crime cases to the Court realm is difficult because the crime is more complex and the trial process is the same as any Court case, but in this situation presenting expert witnesses is very important. The perpetrators of the crime can be subject to Article 35 of Law Number 19 of 2016 concerning Electronic Information and Transactions" being a legal basis for the crime of phishing. Therefore, in the phishing crime case handled by the Sukabumi City District Court, a verdict was obtained by sentencing the defendant Yudi Stira to 1 year and 7 months imprisonment.

Not only that, it can also be seen that law enforcement in Indonesia, especially Sukabumi City Police still has many certain weaknesses and has not fully implemented law enforcement optimally, especially in cybercrime cases, it can also be seen from various factors, including law, law enforcement, starting with finding and collecting evidence to catch cyber crime perpetrators is difficult to do, then there is the factor of facilities, which is still fixated and relying on laptops and cellphones while the crime continues to grow and results in lagging behind with various other cities which will result in the increasingly widespread cyber crime that occurs, the last is the community factor which still lacks awareness and understanding of the impact of cyber crime.

AUTHORS’ CONTRIBUTION
Author 1: Conceptualization; Project administration; Validation; Writing - review and editing.
Author 2: Conceptualization; Data curation; In-vestigation.
Author 3: Data curation; Investigation.

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